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At any early age, my parents taught me the Golden Rule, “treat 
others the way you would like to be treated.” Around the same time, 
I learned another popular idiom, “put yourself in someone else’s 
shoes.” The latter idiom attempts to teach its audience the im-
portance of empathy. It reminds the listener that one’s first impres-
sion of, or reaction to, a situation may not be correct. To fully eval-
uate the situation, the phrase asks the listener to try to imagine them-
selves in the other person’s situation. Only after the listener has done 
this, should he or she make a final decision. 
This attempt to put oneself in another’s shoes applies in the legal 
context as well. For example, finders of fact are sometimes asked to 
imagine themselves as a reasonable person—a hypothetical person 
who exercises the degree of attention, knowledge, and judgment that 
society requires of its members.1 Alternatively, in trademark in-
fringement lawsuits, which use the ordinary consumer standard, the 
finder of fact is asked to put themselves in the place of the ordinary 
consumer in the marketplace to decide whether or not there is in-
fringement.2 Generally, juries are empowered to make this determi-
nation because “[i]t is assumed that twelve men know more of the 
common affairs of life than does one man, [and] that they can draw 
wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring than 
                                                                                                             
 1 Reasonable Person, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 23:58 (5th ed. 2017). 
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can a single judge.”3 However, judges may occasionally make the 
ordinary consumer determination. When deciding an infringement 
claim at summary judgment, for example, a judge must place him-
self or herself in the shoes of the ordinary consumer in the market-
place. 
This paper addresses the issues that come with having a judicial 
system that allows for trademark infringement lawsuits to be dis-
missed at the summary judgment stage of proceedings—i.e. balanc-
ing the problem of judges adopting an ordinary consumer mindset 
with the preservation of judicial resources—and discusses the pos-
sible solution of adopting a summary trial procedure similar to Can-
ada’s summary trial. Part II provides background information about 
summary judgment on likelihood of confusion in trademark in-
fringement actions in the United States. Part III analyzes the positive 
and negative aspects of a judge’s ability to dismiss trademark in-
fringement lawsuits at summary judgment in the United States. Part 
IV reviews Canada’s trademark law and two Canadian procedures 
for resolving cases before trial: summary judgment and summary 
trial. Part V examines whether adopting a procedure like summary 
trial in the United States would be a viable solution to the problems 
that arise in the United States when dismissing a trademark infringe-
ment lawsuit at summary judgment. Part VI offers final thoughts. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Courts in the United States evaluate trademark infringement 
claims by determining whether the alleged infringing mark is likely 
to cause consumer confusion.4 To make this determination, courts 
balance multiple factors using a likelihood of confusion test.5 Each 
circuit uses its own set of factors, sometimes named after the land-
mark case from that circuit.6 The number of factors courts consider 
varies by circuit and ranges from six to thirteen factors with most 
                                                                                                             
 3 Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 911 (2015) (quoting Railroad 
Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1874)). 
 4 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLAMAN ON UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 21:1 (4th ed. 2017). 
 5 GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & MARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 519 (4th ed. 2014). 
 6 Id. at 30. 
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circuits having about eight factors.7 For example, the Second Circuit 
balances its eight “Polaroid” Factors, while the Federal Circuit ex-
amines its thirteen “DuPont” Factors.8 Although each circuit has its 
own test, all the courts follow the same general pattern and include 
several common factors.9 Each circuit considers the alleged in-
fringer’s intent, whether actual consumer confusion occurred, and a 
variety of “market factors.”10 Such market factors include the simi-
larity of the marks, the similarity of the goods or services, and the 
purchasing conditions under which and the buyers to whom the sales 
are made (i.e. “impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing).11 
At trial, the fact-finder must examine each factor in light of the 
evidence presented and determine whether the factor weighs in fa-
vor of the plaintiff or the defendant. Then, it must balance the factors 
all together to determine whether the defendant’s use is “likely to 
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”12 However, a 
mere possibility of confusion is not enough.13 The fact finder must 
find probable confusion between the marks.14 The court makes this 
determination using an ordinary consumer standard, asking whether 
an ordinary purchaser in the marketplace is likely to be confused by 
the marks.15 
Likelihood of confusion is an issue of fact, not law, at the trial 
court level.16 Despite the test’s factual nature, dismissal of an in-
fringement lawsuit is allowed on summary judgment if there is no 
genuine issue of material fact on the issue of likelihood of confu-
sion.17 In fact, the summary judgment motion can be a powerful 
trademark litigation weapon for either plaintiffs or defendants.18 A 
                                                                                                             
 7 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 23:1; see generally DINWOODIE & JANIS, su-
pra note 5, at 522-23. 
 8 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 5, at 521-23. 
 9 Id. at 520. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 523. 
 12 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 23:1. 
 13 Id. § 23:3. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. § 23:58. 
 16 Id. § 23:67. 
 17 Id. 
 18 3 ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 8.03 (Matthew 
Bender). 
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judge may determine that there is no need for a jury trial because the 
party alleging infringement has not produced any evidence that 
could possibly support a factual finding of likelihood of confusion.19 
For example, a defendant can succeed in having the case dismissed 
at summary judgment by showing a lack of any genuine issue of 
material fact on likelihood of confusion due to a total dissimilarity 
of the goods or services involved or due to the complete dissimilar-
ity of the marks.20 Alternatively, a judge may determine that trial is 
unnecessary if there is sufficient evidence showing a likelihood of 
consumer confusion.21 Although obtaining summary judgment is 
difficult for a plaintiff on the issue of likelihood of confusion, it is 
not impossible if the facts of liability are clear.22 
Motions for summary judgment that are properly supported by 
affidavits, exhibits, depositions, etc., can dispose of the entire case 
before trial, sparing both time and money.23 However, if the motion 
is denied, the adverse party receives the benefit of seeing—albeit in 
condensed form—the moving party’s theory of the case and main 
proof.24 Thus, the nonmoving party will likely have the ability to 
prepare more thoroughly for trial, including preparing a more effec-
tive cross-examination.25 Alternatively, the nonmoving party will 
likely introduce counter-affidavits and briefly disclose its own the-
ory and proof in an attempt to block summary judgment. These ac-
tions will allow the moving party a greater opportunity to prepare 
for trial.26 Thus, it is not likely that either party will gain the upper 
hand if the motion for summary judgment is denied and the case 
proceeds to trial.27 
At the appellate level, the majority of the circuit courts of appeal 
treat likelihood of confusion as an issue of fact reviewed on appeal 
using a “clearly erroneous” standard.28 The Third Circuit, for exam-
ple, has emphasized that “[t]he question of likelihood of confusion 
                                                                                                             
 19 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 32:120. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See id. § 32:121. 
 22 Id. 
 23 GILSON, supra note 18. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 23:73. 
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is ultimately one of fact, and we cannot roll up our sleeves and en-
gage in the balancing ourselves.”29 However, three circuits are in the 
minority, treating likelihood of confusion as an issue of law re-
viewed de novo.30 Although the minority circuits treat the trial 
court’s underlying evaluation of the likelihood of confusion factors 
as an issue of fact reviewed using a clearly erroneous standard, the 
circuits treat the weighing and balancing of those factors and the 
ultimate conclusion as to confusion as a question of law reviewed 
de novo.31 The Sixth Circuit is in the minority of circuits that con-
sider likelihood of confusion to be an issue of law reviewed de 
novo.32 In Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Champions Golf Club, Inc., 
the court emphasized that it applies a clearly erroneous standard to 
the trial court’s finding of fact supporting the likelihood of confu-
sion factors but reviews de novo the legal question of whether those 
facts constitute a likelihood of confusion.33 
Courts holding that likelihood of confusion is a question of fact 
often determine, when deciding on motions for summary judgment, 
that the likelihood of confusion test poses a genuine material fact 
that should be left for trial.34 However, courts may also determine 
that no genuine factual dispute exists on the issue of likelihood of 
confusion if the court finds that no reasonable jury or factfinder 
could make a contrary determination.35 Courts have “an important 
authority to monitor the outer limits of substantial similarity within 
which a jury is permitted to make the factual determination whether 
there is a likelihood of confusion”; and thus, courts may grant mo-
tions for summary judgment on likelihood of confusion.36 Factual 
disputes solely over a single likelihood of confusion factor will gen-
erally not prevent summary judgment unless the factor tilts the entire 
balance in favor of such a finding. However, a minority of courts 
                                                                                                             
 29 A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 237 
(3d Cir. 2000). 
 30 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 23:73. 
 31 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 5, at 524. 
 32 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 23:73. 
 33 Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 
1116 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 34 GILSON, supra note 18. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
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hold that consideration of the similarity of the marks factor alone 
may allow the court to grant summary judgment.37 
Summary judgment is an integral part of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure because it allows for the “just, speedy and inexpen-
sive determination of every action and proceeding.”38 However, 
some circuit courts of appeal generally disfavor allowing summary 
judgment on the question of likelihood of confusion. Other circuits 
are more willing to dismiss cases on summary judgment.39 For ex-
ample, the Ninth Circuit has been the most negative of the circuits 
when considering granting summary judgment in a trademark in-
fringement lawsuit.40 The court has often cautioned that “[b]ecause 
of the intensely factual nature of trademark disputes, summary judg-
ment is generally disfavored in the trademark arena.”41 In Jada Toys, 
Inc. v. Mattel, the Ninth Circuit even held that granting summary 
judgment was improper despite the fact that a clear dissimilarity of 
the marks was the basis for concluding that there was no genuine 
issue of fact as to the likelihood of confusion.42 However, the Ninth 
Circuit has on occasion found that summary judgment is appropri-
ate.43 
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit has been more liberal than the 
Ninth Circuit in granting motions for summary judgment.44 Alt-
hough the Seventh Circuit has noted that “a motion for summary 
judgment in trademark infringement cases must be approached with 
great caution,” the court does not require that each of the seven con-
fusion factors weigh in favor of a single party. For example, in 
Sorensen v. WD-40 Co., the court upheld a granting of summary 
                                                                                                             
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 5, at 524. 
 40 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 32:120. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, 518 F.3d 628, 637 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 43 Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that a finding of summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine 
issue of material fact exists); see also Applied Info. Sciences Corp. v. EBay, Inc., 
511 F. 3d 966, 966 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that summary judgment is proper 
where the registrant failed to provide any admissible evidence tending to show a 
likelihood of confusion). 
 44 See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 32:120. 
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judgment despite some of the likelihood of confusion factors sup-
porting a finding of a likelihood of confusion where the three most 
important factors (similarity of the marks, bad faith intent, and evi-
dence of actual confusion) weighed in favor of the defendant.45 
The Supreme Court has yet to address whether likelihood of con-
fusion can be resolved at summary judgment. However, it discussed 
a similar issue in Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank.46 There, the 
Court found that the trademark issue of tacking—which uses the 
same ordinary consumer standard as likelihood of confusion—
should be left to the jury.47 However, the Court emphasized that “[i]f 
the facts warrant it, a judge may decide a tacking question on a mo-
tion for summary judgment.”48 Ultimately, the Court in Hana Fi-
nancial held that when a jury is to be empaneled and when the facts 
do not warrant an entry of summary judgment, the jury must decide 
whether tacking is warranted.49 
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF 
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK 
INFRINGEMENT LAWSUITS 
A. The “Vulcan mind meld” Problem 
A judge must examine the likelihood of confusion factors when 
deciding whether or not an infringement lawsuit should be dis-
missed on summary judgment.50 Often, the judge identifies and dis-
cusses evidence relevant to each individual factor and then draws a 
conclusion as to whether that factor weighs in favor of a likelihood 
of confusion between the two marks.51 Then, the judge uses his or 
her findings from each individual factor to examine the likelihood 
of confusion test as a whole, determining whether sufficient evi-
dence was presented for the lawsuit to survive summary judgment.52 
                                                                                                             
 45 Sorensen v. WD-40 Co., 792 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 46 Hana Fin., Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 907. 
 47 Id. at 909. 
 48 Id. at 911. 
 49 Id. at 913. 
 50 See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 23:1. 
 51 Id. § 32:120. 
 52 Id. 
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Judges perform the likelihood of confusion inquiry from the per-
spective of the ordinary consumer in the marketplace.53 
William E. Gallagher and Ronald C. Goodstein question a 
judge’s ability to imagine themselves as an ordinary consumer, 
likening the attempt to a work of science-fiction by labeling it the 
“Vulcan mind meld.”54 The term comes from the ability of Star 
Trek’s Vulcan character, Mr. Spock, to touch someone’s head with 
his fingertips and experience that person’s thoughts as if they were 
his own.55 Gallagher and Goodstein caution that “[t]he proposition 
that a human being can perform a ‘Vulcan mind meld’ with relevant 
consumers in the marketplace is, like the term, fiction.”56 This fic-
tional proposition is especially relevant at summary judgment be-
cause when a judge uses the “Vulcan mind meld” to decide likeli-
hood of confusion, he or she ultimately determines whether or not a 
lawsuit can move forward. 
Gallagher and Goodstein caution that judges should not assume 
themselves to be fairly representative of the class of relevant con-
sumers.57 Because the judge applying the likelihood of confusion 
factors is also a consumer, he or she likely has his own subjective 
preferences.58 However, these preferences are often entirely irrele-
vant to a proper confusion analysis59 because it is unlikely that a 
judge can share the same thoughts and impressions as the ordinary 
consumer in the marketplace.60 If, as is often the case, the judge try-
ing a particular lawsuit is more educated and affluent than the ordi-
nary consumer, the judge’s subjective impression may differ from 
that of the ordinary consumer in the marketplace.61 Take the per-
ceived purchase risk of a product—which is subjective in nature—
as an example. An educated and affluent judge may have the sub-
                                                                                                             
 53 See id. § 23:91. 
 54 William E. Gallagher & Ronald C. Goodstein, Inference Versus Specula-
tion in Trademark Infringement Litigation: Abandoning the Vulcan Mind Meld, 
94 TMR 1229, 1232 (2004). 
 55 Id. at 1229. 
 56 Id. at 1232. 
 57 Id. 
 58 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 5, at 525. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Gallagher & Goodstein, supra note 54, at 1229. 
 61 Id. at 1232. 
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jective impression that a consumer’s decision to purchase a particu-
lar product is routine or inconsequential, while the ordinary con-
sumer may associate a material level of financial risk with the same 
purchase.62 
Further, the situation that judges address in litigation is neces-
sarily substantially different from the ordinary consumer’s experi-
ence in the marketplace.63 Consumers have naturally acquired 
knowledge, experience, and motivations; have no mission to look 
for or experience confusion; and experience actual marketplace cir-
cumstances.64 In contrast, judges are artificially focused on infringe-
ment during litigation.65 Not only do judges have knowledge of the 
identities of the parties, the marks, and the products, but their main 
job in infringement litigation is to examine evidence that might sup-
port an inference of likelihood of confusion.66 Further, judges gen-
erally consider only secondhand evidence of marketplace situa-
tions.67 All of these factors taken together may result in judges plac-
ing undue emphasis on facts taken out of the actual marketplace con-
text.68 
Finally, judges are sometimes asked to imagine themselves as 
an ordinary consumer in a class of which they are not—and will 
never be—a member. In Triangle Publications Inc. v. Rohrlich, the 
trial judge examined whether teenage girls would be likely to con-
fuse plaintiff’s mark, “Seventeen,” for magazines with the defend-
ant’s mark, “Miss Seventeen,” for girdles.69 In his dissent, Judge 
Frank criticized the trial judge’s “shaky kind of guess” that the or-
dinary female teenage consumer was likely to be confused by the 
two marks.70 He suggested that courts should obtain information 
about the likelihood of confusion between the marks from the ordi-
nary consumers themselves.71 Judge Frank went so far as to question 
adolescent girls, their mothers, and their sisters as to whether or not 
                                                                                                             
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 1231. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 1231. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 5, at 525. 
 70 Triangle Publications v. Rohrlich, 167 F. 2d 969, 976 (2d Cir. 1948). 
 71 Id. 
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confusion was likely between “Seventeen” magazine and “Miss 
Seventeen” girdles.72 
Gallagher and Goodstein offer a similar solution to Judge Frank. 
They propose using consumer research to inform the conclusion on 
likelihood of confusion.73 Gallagher and Goodstein suggest that sur-
veys about consumer perception and responses should be deemed 
important, and in some cases necessary, for plaintiffs to prevail on a 
trademark infringement claim.74 Confusion surveys may provide 
finders of fact with evidence of actual confusion sufficient to sup-
port a finding of likelihood of confusion.75 These surveys measure 
whether consumers believe that the senior user is the source of the 
alleged infringer’s product or whether it sponsors or approves of that 
product.76 
At first glance, survey evidence appears to be a viable solution 
to the “Vulcan mind meld” problem. However, survey use can pre-
sent additional problems depending on the viability of the survey.77 
Some courts have found issue with the survey population, requiring 
that the universe tested by the survey be representative of the appro-
priate consuming public.78 The appropriate consuming public is 
generally defined as potential purchasers of the infringer’s prod-
ucts.79 Additionally, if the survey questions are phrased in a mis-
leading manner or the pool of respondents is not appropriate given 
the circumstances of the lawsuit, the survey results will likely be 
misleading.80 This misleading information is particularly problem-
atic at summary judgment, where a judge’s reliance on a misleading 
survey could prevent a party from being able to try its case. 
                                                                                                             
 72 Id. at 977. 
 73 Gallagher & Goodstein, supra note 54, at 1235. 
 74 Id. 
 75 GILSON, supra note 18. 
 76 Id. 
 77 See generally Daniel A. Klein, Admissibility and weight of consumer sur-
vey in litigation under trademark opposition, trademark infringement, and false 
designation of origin provisions of Lanham Act (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1063, 1114, and 
1125), 98 A.L.R. FED. 20 (1990). 
 78 GILSON, supra note 18. 
 79 Id. 
 80 See id. 
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B. Assessing the Similarity of the Marks Factor: A Balancing 
Act Between the Preservation of Judicial Resources and the 
Need for the Ordinary Consumer Fact Finder 
The increasing use of summary judgment is one factor causing 
fewer and fewer cases to reach trial in federal courts.81 Dismissing 
a case on summary judgment allows courts to preserve judicial re-
sources by preventing a case, in which there is no genuine issue of 
material fact, from going to trial.82 Because the similarity of the 
marks factor is “by far the most influential” in the likelihood of con-
fusion analysis,83 it may be tempting for a judge who perceives the 
marks to be dissimilar to determine that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and to dismiss the lawsuit on summary judgment. On 
one hand, by dismissing the aforementioned case, the court does not 
waste judicial resources trying a case in which there is no genuine 
issue of material fact; and thus, the outcome is already certain. On 
the other hand, dismissing a case because the judge believes the 
marks to be dissimilar does not take into account a variety of other 
factors, including the risks of side-by-side comparison, using the 
real-world purchasing context, and the danger of the judge’s subjec-
tive beliefs entering the decision. 
i. Side-by-Side Analyses in Top Tobacco and Malletier 
In the Seventh Circuit case, Top Tobacco, L.P. v. North Atlantic 
Operating Co., Inc., Judge Easterbrook concluded that it was “next 
to impossible to believe that any consumer, however careless, would 
confuse the products.”84 He found that summary judgment was ap-
propriate because the marks were so dissimilar that no consumer 
could be confused as to who made the respective products.85 Judge 
Easterbrook’s analysis of the likelihood of confusion factors ended 
after the similarity of the marks inquiry.86 “If we know for sure that 
                                                                                                             
 81 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 32:113. 
 82 See generally id. 
 83 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark 
Infringement, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1581, 1600 (2006). 
 84 Top Tobacco, L.P. v. N. Atl. Operating Co., Inc., 509 F. 3d 380, 383 (7th 
Cir. 2007). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
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consumers are not confused about a product’s origin,” Judge Easter-
brook emphasized, “there is no need to consult even a single [fac-
tor].”87 Thus, Judge Easterbrook proposed that “knowing for sure” 
allows a judge to bypass the likelihood of confusion factors.88 This 
analysis begs the following question: how can a judge “know for 
sure” that no consumer confusion exists? Judge Easterbrook recog-
nized in the Top Tobacco opinion that judges “may misunderstand 
how trade dress affects purchasing decisions.”89 
Absolute knowledge is a high standard—and a high standard 
should be required when dismissing a trademark infringement law-
suit before an ordinary consumer factfinder has a chance to evaluate 
the case. Moreover, the similarity of the marks factor is complex.90 
When examining the similarity of marks factor, the court must do 
more than view the marks side-by-side in the courtroom.91 It must 
attempt to simulate the ordinary consumer’s encounter with the 
mark in the real world and then assess the similarity of the marks 
with that context in mind.92 The marketplace in Top Tobacco in-
volved the two consumer goods sitting next to each other on a store 
shelf.93 However, that is not always the case in infringement actions. 
Sometimes, the average consumer in the marketplace does not have 
the luxury of viewing the marks side-by-side.94 
In Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory Ware-
house Corporation, a trade dress case, the Second Circuit warned 
against using side-by-side similarity comparisons to analyze likeli-
hood of confusion.95 The plaintiff sold a line of multicolored hand-
bags through its Louis Vuitton stores and at upscale department 
stores with selling prices ranging between $400 and $4,000, while 
                                                                                                             
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 5, at 544. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 See Top Tobacco, L.P., 509 F.3d at 380. 
 94 See Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 426 F.3d 532, 
534 (2d. Cir. 2005) (vacating the district court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion for 
injunctive relief). 
 95 Id. 
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the defendant sold a line of multicolored handbags through its dis-
count retail stores at the price of $29.98 per bag.96 The plaintiff 
claimed that the defendant’s trade dress was likely to cause both in-
itial interest confusion (i.e., the purchaser is initially drawn to the 
handbag because they confuse the origin of defendant’s bag with 
plaintiff’s handbags97) and post-sale confusion (i.e., someone other 
than the purchaser—chiefly potential purchasers—will see the de-
fendant’s bag and mistakenly relate it to the plaintiff’s hand-
bags98).99 
In Malletier, the ordinary consumer in the marketplace would 
not simultaneously view the defendant’s and the plaintiff’s hand-
bags.100 The court emphasized that “the Lanham Act requires a court 
to analyze the similarity of the products in light of the way in which 
the marks are actually displayed in their purchasing context.”101 It is 
true that two products may be easily differentiated when carefully 
viewed side-by-side.102 However, those same products may still be 
confusingly similar in the eyes of ordinary consumers who encoun-
ter the products separately under typical purchasing conditions.103 It 
is precisely that “real-world” confusion that the Lanham Act seeks 
to eliminate.104 Thus, the Malletier court found side-by-side viewing 
to be inappropriate when it is isolated viewing that is at issue in the 
marketplace.105 
Although it may be tempting for a judge to attempt to preserve 
judicial resources by dismissing an infringement lawsuit at summary 
judgment when the marks appear to be entirely dissimilar, it is not 
always proper to do so. A judge must ensure that he or she considers 
the marks in the real-world purchasing context—which is not al-
ways side-by-side—because to do otherwise “frustrates (however 
unintentionally) Congress’s intent.”106 
                                                                                                             
 96 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 5, at 544. 
 97 See generally GILSON, supra note 18, § 5.14. 
 98 See generally id. 
 99 DINWOODIE & JANIS, supra note 5, at 544. 
 100 See Malletier, 426 F.3d at 539. 
 101 Id. at 538. 
 102 Id. at 539. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 538. 
 106 Malletier, 426 F.3d at 539. 
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ii. Jada on the Danger of Elevating a Judge’s Subjective 
Beliefs over other Relevant Evidence 
Finally, in Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., the Ninth Circuit 
warned against treating any one factor as dispositive to the ultimate 
question of likelihood of confusion.107 The Jada court held that the 
dissimilarity of the marks alone does not absolve the need to inquire 
into evidence of other likelihood of confusion factors.108 The court 
emphasized that holding otherwise would allow the possibility that 
persuasive evidence of one particular factor—dissimilarity of the 
marks—be considered at the expense of relevant evidence of other 
factors.109 Giving courts the ability to rely on the dissimilarity of the 
marks factor alone to conclude that no likelihood of confusion exists 
would create the potential for a judge to elevate his or her own sub-
jective impressions of the relative dissimilarity of the marks over 
evidence of, for example, actual consumer confusion.110 The likeli-
hood of confusion test would be undermined if the subjective im-
pressions of a particular judge were weighed at the expense of other 
relevant evidence.111 Thus, although it may be tempting for a judge 
to conserve judicial resources by dismissing a trademark infringe-
ment lawsuit because he or she perceives the marks to be dissimilar, 
to do so would be improper.112 
C. Why Judges Should Have the Authority to Decide Trademark 
Infringement Cases at Summary Judgment 
Preventing judges from dismissing trademark infringement ac-
tions at summary judgment on likelihood of confusion would place 
an undue monetary burden on defendants and open the floodgates to 
infringement litigation. Summary judgment provides a quick and in-
expensive opportunity for parties to dispose of a case in which there 
are no real issues of fact that call for trial.113 Summary judgment 
also raises the costs and risks associated with the pretrial phases of 
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litigation for plaintiffs.114 Summary judgment effectively serves as 
a screening mechanism to prevent plaintiffs from bringing frivolous 
lawsuits because such lawsuits are unlikely to survive summary 
judgment.115 It follows that eliminating summary judgment as a 
screening mechanism will allow for an increase in frivolous claims, 
opening the floodgates to litigation.116 By definition, frivolous law-
suits are cases filed with the intention to extort a settlement payment 
from a defendant by threatening a costly legal battle.117 An increase 
in frivolous lawsuits therefore places an unjust monetary burden on 
defendants, the targets of these lawsuits.118 Thus, judges should 
maintain the authority to decide infringement cases on likelihood of 
confusion at summary judgment because preventing plaintiffs from 
bringing frivolous lawsuits preserves judicial resources and avoids 
placing an undue monetary burden on defendants. 
D. Finding Guidance in Hana Financial v. Hana Bank 
The Supreme Court has not yet considered whether it is proper 
to determine likelihood of confusion at summary judgment in a 
trademark infringement lawsuit. However, the Supreme Court did 
recently address a similar issue—whether a judge or a jury should 
determine the outcome of a case on the trademark issue of tacking—
in Hana Financial.119 Like the likelihood of confusion test in trade-
mark infringement actions, tacking is also analyzed from the per-
spective of an ordinary consumer.120 In Hana Financial, the Su-
preme Court held that because the tacking inquiry operates under an 
ordinary consumer standard, a jury should make the determina-
tion.121 In the Hana Financial opinion, Justice Sotomayor acknowl-
edged that the court has long recognized across a variety of doctrinal 
contexts that when the relevant question is how an ordinary person 
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or community would make an assessment, the jury is generally the 
decision maker that should provide the fact-intensive answer.122 
Justice Sotomayor’s Hana Financial opinion employs strong 
language to advocate that ordinary consumer analyses be made by 
juries. However, the unanimous opinion goes on to find that a judge 
may decide a tacking question on a motion for summary judgment 
when the facts warrant it.123 The court in Hana Financial ultimately 
held that “when a jury trial has been requested and when the facts 
do not warrant entry of summary judgment . . . the question whether 
tacking is warranted must be decided by a jury.”124 
Ultimately, the Hana Financial opinion is instructive in a trade-
mark infringement context because both tacking and infringement 
use an ordinary consumer standard in their respective analyses. De-
spite the ordinary consumer standard lending itself to being a ques-
tion for the jury to determine, the Supreme Court held in Hana Fi-
nancial that the trademark issue of tacking can be resolved at sum-
mary judgment when the facts warrant it.125 It follows that the Su-
preme Court would be likely to similarly find that when the facts 
warrant it, the trademark issue of infringement can be resolved at 
summary judgment. Thus, the Supreme Court is unlikely to create a 
bright-line rule that judges should not decide likelihood of confusion 
at summary judgment. Therefore, in order to solve the issues raised 
by deciding likelihood of confusion at summary judgment—the 
“Vulcan mind meld” problem, the risk of side-by-side comparison, 
the need to evaluate the real-world marketplace context, etc., —
other avenues must be explored. 
IV. TURNING TO CANADIAN LAW FOR A POTENTIAL 
SOLUTION 
Trademark law in the United States and Canada share various 
common aspects. Like the United States, Canada provides legal pro-
tection to both registered and unregistered trademarks through the 
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Trade-marks Act and at common law.126 Both the United States and 
Canada determine whether a mark is infringing on another trade-
mark by examining likelihood of confusion factors, which include 
the similarity of the marks and the intent of the allegedly infringing 
mark holder.127 Further, the confusion analysis is determined using 
an average consumer standard in both the United States and Can-
ada.128 One notable difference between trademark actions in the 
United States and Canada is that, in Canada, trademark infringement 
trials are conducted by a judge without a jury.129 Conversely, trade-
mark infringement trials in the United States are generally tried by 
a judge with a jury.130 The following section examines Canada’s 
treatment of trademark infringement actions at the summary pro-
ceedings stage for a potential solution to the foregoing problems pre-
sented at summary judgment in infringement actions in the United 
States. 
A. Trademark Infringement in Canada 
Canada’s Trade-marks Act allows an action to be brought for 
trademark infringement.131 Trademark infringement actions are typ-
ically brought before the Federal Court of Canada.132 However, ac-
tions for infringement may also be brought in the Provincial court.133 
A Federal Court decision has effect throughout Canada, while a Pro-
vincial Court decision only has effect in that province.134 In Canada, 
a trademark infringement trial is conducted by a judge without a 
jury.135 The trial consists of the testimony of live witnesses, although 
expert evidence may also be introduced by affidavit.136 Survey evi-
dence is also commonly introduced at trial to determine whether the 
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marks are confusingly similar.137 However, to be admissible, the 
survey evidence must be fair and unbiased, conducted by a qualified 
expert, cover an issue outside the experience of the judge, and usu-
ally may not be confined to a limited geographical area.138 Admis-
sible survey evidence can be accorded great weight by the courts.139 
Parties may also obtain preliminary injunctions in trademark in-
fringement lawsuits.140 However, to obtain a preliminary injunction, 
a party must show that there is a serious issue to be tried, that the 
plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of an injunction, 
and that the balance of convenience is in the plaintiff’s favor.141 
A registered trademark holder has the exclusive right to use the 
mark. This right is infringed by any person who, without authoriza-
tion, sells, distributes, or advertises goods or services in association 
with a confusingly similar trademark.142 A trademark is confusingly 
similar to another trademark if the use of both trademarks in the 
same area would likely lead to the inference that the products asso-
ciated with such trademarks are made by the same person.143 Cana-
dian courts should consider all surrounding circumstances when de-
termining whether two trademarks are confusingly similar.144 The 
Trade-marks Act provides the court with a list of factors to consider 
in determining whether trademarks are similar, including the inher-
ent distinctiveness of the marks and the extent to which the marks 
are known, the length of time the marks have been in use, the nature 
of the products, the nature of the trade, and the degree of similarity 
between the marks.145 Canadian courts should also consider the in-
tent of the allegedly infringing mark holder.146 Whether or not a 
mark is famous is not a specifically enumerated factor, however, it 
is implicit in three of the factors provided in the Trade-marks Act—
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the inherent distinctiveness, the extent to which the mark has be-
come known, and the length of time that it has been used.147 
Canada’s Federal Court of Appeals has set four standards to an-
alyze the likelihood of confusion.148 First, courts must use the im-
perfect recollection test to determine the similarity of the marks.149 
This test is similar to the ordinary consumer standard in the United 
States in that it requires the court to consider the average, “some-
what-hurried”150 consumer’s imperfect recollection when analyzing 
the likelihood of confusion.151 Canada’s imperfect recollection test 
finds that it is improper to do a side-by-side comparison of the 
marks. The marks should not be subjected to careful side-by-side 
analysis because the court must instead attempt to put itself in the 
position of the average consumer—a person who has only a general 
and not a precise recollection of the earlier mark and then sees the 
later mark by itself.152 If the court finds that the average consumer 
is likely to believe that the later mark’s product is made by the ear-
lier mark’s brand (of which the consumer “has only such a recollec-
tion”), the court may properly conclude that the marks are similar.153 
Second, the marks must be considered in their entirety.154 The nature 
of the goods associated with the mark must also be considered.155 
Finally, the court must consider the degree of resemblance of the 
appearance, sound, and ideas suggested.156 
When the court finds that trademark infringement is present, it 
may issue an injunction.157 The court also has the authority to order 
that any infringing goods, packages, labels, and advertising material 
be destroyed.158 The court can also order the recovery of either the 
damages sustained as a result of the infringement or an accounting 
of the infringer’s profits attributable to the infringement, but not 
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both.159 To award both damages and profits would allow the plaintiff 
double recovery.160 However, the court may additionally award liti-
gation costs to the successful party in a trademark infringement ac-
tion. Finally, in some cases, the court may award punitive dam-
ages.161 
B. Summary Proceedings in Canada: The 2009 Amendment to 
the Federal Court Rules 
Canada’s Federal Court Rules allow for two types of summary 
proceedings prior to trial, summary judgment and summary trial.162 
In 2009, Canada amended its Federal Court Rules to modify the ex-
isting rules on summary judgment and to include a summary trial 
procedure.163 Prior to the 2009 amendment, the judicial interpreta-
tion of the summary judgment rule limited the instances in which 
summary judgment could be granted.164 The prior jurisprudence re-
quired that motions for summary judgment be dismissed when there 
was an issue of credibility or conflicting evidence and the outcome 
of the motion turned on the drawing of inferences.165 
The 2009 amendment recognized and sought to correct a defi-
ciency in the prior summary judgment provisions’ ability to “pro-
vide the flexibility needed to manage the Federal Court’s caseload 
efficiently by the expeditious disposition of cases that do not require 
a full trial.”166 The summary trial procedure included in the 2009 
amendment was modeled after a similar procedure found in the Brit-
ish Columbia Rules of Court. Including a summary trial procedure 
allows for the court to dispose summarily of actions in a greater 
range of circumstances than was permitted under the previous 
rules.167 
Thus, the 2009 amendment to Canada’s Federal Court Rules 
modified the summary judgment rules and added a summary trial 
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procedure, in part, to preserve judicial resources.168 This is because 
Canada’s civil justice system is “premised upon the value that the 
adjudication process must be fair and just.”169 A fair and just result 
cannot be achieved when the process is disproportionate to the na-
ture of the dispute and the interests involved.170 
In Hryniak v. Mauldin, the Supreme Court of Canada called for 
a shift in the culture of Canada’s civil justice system.171 The court 
emphasized that the proportionality principle—which says that the 
best forum for resolving a dispute is not always that with the most 
painstaking procedure—can act as a touchstone for access to civil 
justice.172 For example, the court highlighted that protracted trials, 
with unnecessary expense and delay, can prevent the fair and just 
resolution of disputes.173 
The 2009 amendment also sought to give parties more control 
over the pace of their litigation.174 The inclusion of a summary trial 
procedure enabled the court to determine an issue or action through 
summary trial even when conflicting evidence or issues of credibil-
ity are present, which would have required a full trial prior to the 
2009 amendment.175 By expanding the number of instances in which 
an action could be disposed of summarily through the means of sum-
mary trial, the 2009 amendment provided greater flexibility to the 
parties to litigation and to the court, while enhancing access to jus-
tice.176 
C. The Procedure of Summary Judgment and Summary Trial in 
Canada 
In Canada, a party may bring a motion for summary judgment 
or a motion for summary trial on all or some of the issues raised in 
the pleadings at any time after the defendant has filed a defense, but 
before trial has been scheduled.177 Canadian trademark infringement 
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actions may be decided at summary judgment178 or summary trial.179 
Parties to intellectual property actions in Canada may also jointly 
agree to proceed by way of summary trial, rather than spending time 
and money preparing for and having a full trial.180 However, once a 
party moves for summary judgment or summary trial, the party may 
not bring a further motion for either summary judgment or summary 
trial unless the party receives permission from the court.181 As a gen-
eral principle, the court must interpret and apply the rules governing 
summary judgment and summary trial “so as to secure the just, most 
expeditious and least expensive determination of every proceeding 
on its merits.”182 
i. Summary Judgment 
In Canada, summary judgment is available because it allows for 
the efficient disposition of actions, in whole or in part, where con-
ducting a trial to hear a full range of evidence is unnecessary.183 
Courts may grant motions for summary judgment when there is no 
genuine issue for trial.184 A motion for summary judgment must be 
based solely on the evidence offered by the parties in their motion 
records.185 A response to a motion for summary judgment cannot 
rely on what might be adduced as evidence at a later stage in the 
proceedings.186 Rather, it must provide specific facts and offer the 
evidence showing that there is no genuine issue for trial.187 
If the court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial with 
respect to a claim or defense on a motion for summary judgment, 
the court must grant summary judgment.188 However, if the court 
finds that there is a genuine issue of fact or law for trial, the court 
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may “nevertheless determine that issue by way of summary trial and 
make any order necessary for the conduct of the summary trial; 
or . . . dismiss the motion in whole or in part and order that the ac-
tion, or the issues in the action not disposed of by summary judg-
ment, proceed to trial or that the action be conducted as a specially 
managed proceeding.”189 
ii. Summary Trial 
The summary trial procedure allows the court to determine an 
issue or action even if there is conflicting evidence or if issues of 
credibility are present.190 The motion record for a summary trial 
must contain all of the evidence a party wishes to rely upon, includ-
ing affidavits, admissions, affidavits or statements of an expert wit-
ness, and other admissible evidence.191 The court is permitted to 
draw an adverse inference if a party fails to file responding or rebut-
tal evidence.192 After a party moves for summary trial, no further 
affidavits or statements may be served unless the party received per-
mission from the court.193 However, in the case of the moving party, 
there is also an exception if the content of the affidavit or statement 
is limited to evidence that would be admissible at trial as rebuttal 
evidence.194 Further, the court has authority at summary trial to 
make any order required for the conduct of the summary trial.195 
This includes the authority to issue orders requiring a deponent or 
an expert who has given a statement to be cross-examined live be-
fore the court at the summary trial proceeding.196 Finally, the court 
may draw an adverse inference at summary trial if a party fails to 
cross-examine on an affidavit.197 
The court must dismiss a motion for summary trial if “the issues 
raised are not suitable for summary trial” or if “summary trial would 
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not assist in the efficient resolution of the action.”198 The party seek-
ing summary trial has the burden to prove that a summary trial is 
appropriate.199 A judge evaluates the following factors to determine 
whether a case is appropriate for summary trial: the amount of 
money involved, the complexity of the matter, the urgency of the 
matter, any prejudice delay may cause, comparing the cost of taking 
the case to a full trial to the amount of money involved, whether the 
case requires an extensive trial, whether the credibility of witnesses 
is critical in the case, whether summary trial will be a waste of time, 
whether summary trial will cause the action to be divided into sepa-
rate trials, and any other relevant issue.200 
Once a motion for summary trial is before the court, the party 
making an assertion has the burden to prove that assertion using rel-
evant evidence and applying appropriate law.201 If the court dis-
misses a motion for summary trial, the court may order the action 
(or issues within the action that were not disposed of by summary 
trial) to proceed to trial.202 Alternatively, the court may grant judg-
ment either generally or on an issue if the court is satisfied that there 
is sufficient evidence for adjudication, unless the court finds that it 
would be unjust to decide the issues on the motion for summary 
trial,203 regardless of complexity or conflicting evidence.204 When 
granting judgment on a motion for summary trial, the court may 
make any order necessary for the disposition of the action, including 
an order directing a trial to determine the amount of money to which 
the moving party is entitled, imposing terms regarding enforcement 
of the judgment, and awarding costs.205 
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V. SHOULD THE UNITED STATES ADOPT A SUMMARY 
PROCEEDING SIMILAR TO CANADA’S SUMMARY 
TRIAL? 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Hana Financial— “when a jury 
trial has been requested and when the facts do not warrant entry of 
summary judgment . . . the question whether tacking is warranted 
must be decided by a jury”—suggests that the Supreme Court will 
not create a bright-line rule eliminating summary judgment on the 
likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement claims.206 Not 
adopting said bright-line rule benefits courts and defendants alike 
because summary judgment acts as a screen that prevents frivolous 
lawsuits, which cost both courts and defendants time and money to 
manage.207 However, the availability of summary judgment as an 
option for disposing of an infringement claim poses various prob-
lems. First, it is nearly impossible for a judge to perform the “Vulcan 
mind meld” required to become an ordinary consumer in the likeli-
hood of confusion analysis.208 Further, judges should exercise cau-
tion when examining the similarity of the marks factor to ensure that 
their analysis of the similarity of the marks considers the real-world 
purchasing context and does not elevate their own subjective beliefs 
over other evidence.209 Canada’s summary trial procedure offers a 
suitable solution to the foregoing issues. 
A. Why Summary Trial is the Proper Solution 
Although it would be beneficial to always have a jury decide the 
question of likelihood of confusion, an analysis of the Supreme 
Court’s Hana Financial decision provides that eliminating summary 
procedure altogether is unlikely. Canada’s summary trial or a similar 
procedure—like a formal, binding version of the Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution procedures: summary jury trial and summary bench 
trial210—is a desirable alternative to summary judgment. Summary 
trial is a better procedural choice than summary judgment in decid-
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ing likelihood of confusion because it offers parties more of an op-
portunity to litigate their position than summary judgment provides. 
Summary trial is also a viable alternative to summary judgment be-
cause it preserves judicial resources. 
Summary trial should replace summary judgment in likelihood 
of confusion actions because summary trial allows parties to more 
exhaustively advocate their case. At summary trial, both parties 
have the benefit of cross-examining witnesses and experts, which is 
not an option at summary judgment.211 The opportunity for cross-
examination also benefits the judge, who must decide whether a 
likelihood of confusion exists. The judge is able to examine more 
evidence on likelihood of confusion at summary trial than he or she 
would at summary judgment. This opportunity is beneficial to the 
judge who must become the “ordinary consumer” to determine the 
likelihood of confusion. For example, a judge may benefit from 
hearing the testimony and cross-examination of a witness providing 
evidence of actual confusion. Hearing the witness’ personal expla-
nation of confusion may assist the judge in understanding how an 
average consumer in the marketplace may be confused by two sim-
ilar marks. Summary trial also gives parties more control over their 
investment in the case because the parties may agree to proceed by 
way of summary trial, spending less time and money than they 
would if they went to trial.212 
Additionally, summary trial is a suitable alternative to summary 
judgment because it preserves judicial resources. Like summary 
judgment, summary trial preserves judicial resources by disposing 
of cases that do not require a full trial, including frivolous claims.213 
Thus, summary trial protects against the opening of the floodgates 
to frivolous infringement litigation that would normally occur with-
out summary judgment. Further, summary trial preserves judicial 
resources more efficiently than summary judgment because sum-
mary trial allows the court to dispose summarily of actions in a 
greater range of circumstances.214 Parties may also elect to forego 
having a full trial and instead choose to have a summary trial, which 
preserves judicial resources. 
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B. Although Canada’s Summary Trial Does Not Solve the 
“Vulcan Mind Meld” Problem, the United States Can Amend 
Canada’s Summary Trial to Cure this Issue 
Issues at summary trial are decided by a judge rather than a 
jury.215 Thus, the judge must still attempt to put themselves in the 
place of the ordinary consumer in the marketplace at summary trial 
on the likelihood of confusion issue. It follows that adopting a sum-
mary trial procedure in the place of summary judgment will not 
solve the problems associated with a judge “becoming” the ordinary 
consumer. Adopting a summary trial procedure will not cure the in-
ability of a judge to perform a “Vulcan mind meld” into an ordinary 
consumer or prevent the risk of the judge’s subjective beliefs enter-
ing the decision. Summary trial similarly does not quash the danger 
of side-by-side mark comparison or ensure that the real-world pur-
chasing context is used. 
Although it is possible that, like judges in the United States, Ca-
nadian judges experience similar problems of “becoming” an ordi-
nary consumer, Canada does not have the option to have a jury trial 
on a trademark infringement action in federal court.216 Therefore, 
there is no opportunity for jurors—who are generally considered av-
erage consumers—to resolve the likelihood of confusion question in 
Canada. Accordingly, Canada’s summary trial rule was not written 
or adopted to resolve any issue with a judge, rather than a jury, be-
coming an ordinary consumer. 
To cure the aforementioned problems associated with summary 
trial, the United States should amend Canada’s summary procedures 
to fit its needs. Adopting a proceeding similar to Canada’s summary 
trial proceeding in trademark infringement actions on the likelihood 
of confusion would provide a suitable solution to the current prob-
lems faced at summary judgment on likelihood of confusion. In 
Canada, parties may move for summary judgment or summary trial 
on likelihood of confusion.217 
However, parties to trademark infringement actions in the 
United States should not be given the ability to resolve likelihood of 
confusion at summary judgment or summary trial. Instead, parties 
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wishing to use a summary proceeding to dispose of an infringement 
case on likelihood of confusion should be limited to using summary 
trial. If parties have access to both summary judgment and summary 
trial as summary proceedings, the issues related to a judge becoming 
an ordinary consumer will be exacerbated. That is because none of 
the problems surrounding judges becoming ordinary consumers are 
resolved by adopting summary trial. Allowing parties to access both 
summary judgment and summary trial would give judges more op-
portunities to decide on likelihood of confusion before juries—the 
appropriate finder-of-fact when considering likelihood of confu-
sion—have the ability to analyze the question. Thus, summary trial 
should be the sole summary proceeding that parties to trademark in-
fringement actions should have access to on the question of likeli-
hood of confusion. 
While summary trial does not directly correct the problem of 
judges becoming the ordinary consumer, it is better suited to help 
judges think like an ordinary consumer at the summary proceeding 
stage than is summary judgment. Judges are able to consider more 
evidence at summary trial than they are at summary judgment. In 
addition to affidavits, admissions, affidavits or statements of an ex-
pert witness, and other admissible evidence, judges are able to con-
sider the testimony and cross-examination of witnesses and experts 
at summary trial. Allowing cross-examination of witnesses and ex-
perts is a unique feature to summary trial, which is unavailable at 
summary judgment. Parties also benefit from having the ability to 
cross-examine witnesses and experts at the summary proceeding 
stage. Therefore, although summary trial fails to solve judges’ ina-
bility to truly transform themselves into the ordinary consumer, it is 
better suited to decide the likelihood of confusion question because 
it allows judges to consider more evidence in making the likelihood 
of confusion determination than summary judgment does. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, adopting a bright-line rule eliminating summary 
judgment on the likelihood of confusion analysis is unlikely due to 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Hana Financial and the negative 
impact such a rule would have on judicial resources. However, al-
lowing summary judgment on the likelihood of confusion is equally 
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as problematic because judges cannot perform a “Vulcan mind 
meld” to become an ordinary consumer and may face issues consid-
ering marks in the real-world context. Canada’s summary trial pro-
cedure offers a solution to these diametrically opposed issues. Alt-
hough a summary trial proceeding does not prevent the judge from 
having to become an ordinary consumer, it preserves judicial re-
sources while also offering parties a better ability to advocate their 
case. Thus, with respect to trademark infringement actions on like-
lihood of confusion, a proceeding similar to summary trial in Can-
ada should be implemented in place of summary judgment. 
 
